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APPLICANTS LAID BARE: THE PRIVACY 
ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSITY 
APPLICATION FILES 
Martin C. McWilliams, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
So—Princeton University’s admissions staff hacked into Yale 
University’s application files to get access to personal information about 
Yale applicants.1 This unlikely event brings to mind the 
comprehensiveness of application files—a veritable one-stop-shop for 
those interested in applicants’ personal information. Just how private are 
university application files? How private should they be? The common 
law, supported by the law-and-economics literature, offers little 
protection to the privacy of personal information.2 In most circumstances 
it allocates to those lawfully in possession of another’s personal 
information a right to re-employ it. A rule of disclosure is not efficient in 
every case, however.3 Significantly for present purposes, a rule of 
disclosure may well be inefficient in adhesive relationships in which 
willing disclosure of high-value, private facts is followed by secondary 
employment unanticipated by the subject. This Article addresses the 
privacy economics of such relationships.4 As an example, this Article 
                                                           
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; Chair, Faculty Admissions 
Committee, 2002-05. Thanks to John Harvey and Ryan Langley for their patient and capable 
assistance. Errors are mine. 
 1. This event is described in many places. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Young, Why Was Princeton 
Snooping in Yale’s Admissions Web Site?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 26, 2002, at A37, available 
at http://chronicle.com/free/2002/07/2002072601n.htm; Margaret L. O’Donnell, FERPA: Only a 
Piece of the Privacy Puzzle, 29 J.C. & U.L. 679, 712-13 (2003). Sadly, this is not an isolated 
instance. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 2. This Article addresses privacy in the sense of “control of [truthful] information 
concerning [an individual’s] person.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 763 
(1989). Such privacy interests are sometimes referred to as “informational privacy,” “data privacy,” 
and, outside the United States, as “data protection law.” Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the 
Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Personal Health Care]. Professor A. Michael Froomkin uses “informational privacy” as 
“shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself.” A. 
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000). 
 3. See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense 
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2384 (1996) (“One way to attack the problem is to set up separate 
rules depending on the type of information at issue.”). 
 4. An economics approach is chosen to avoid engagement in the “normatively charged” 
privacy literature based on consumer profiling. See generally Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, 
Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 411, 415 (2002) (noting the tendency of much of the literature 
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will consider the secondary employment of higher-education 
application-file disclosures in light of two socially desirable objectives 
of the admission process: (1) Maximizing the content and accuracy of 
applicant disclosure to inform admission decisions; and (2) maximizing 
the number of qualified, willing applicants. Social efficiency requires 
pursuit of these goals at least cost. 
As described below, a school’s relationship with its applicants is 
highly asymmetrical in bargaining power and therefore highly adhesive 
in terms of the informational demands the school can make on 
applicants.5 As a condition of being considered for admission each 
applicant must permit the school to assemble a file that is chock full of 
the applicant’s personal information. The student-records privacy rules 
of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”)6 do not 
protect these files because applicants are not “students” within the 
meaning of the statute.7 Nor is personal information such as that found 
                                                           
toward “refraction of social anxieties”). The purpose here is to show that one area of personal 
information accumulation is, by any measure, broken. 
 5. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2078 
(2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Property] (characterizing a situation where individuals do not know 
that personal information gathered will be processed and shared as an “extreme illustration of 
privacy market failure”). 
 6. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2000). FERPA regulates secondary employment of 
student-file content and permits students access to their files, among other things. See id. Under 
FERPA’s broad definition of protected “records,” almost all contents of application files would be 
FERPA protected were applicants “students” within the statutory definition. See Lynn M. Daggett, 
Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 
617, 624-25 (1997). 
 7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(6) (“For the purposes of this section, the term ‘student’ includes 
any person with respect to whom an educational agency or institution maintains education records 
or personally identifiable information, but does not include a person who has not been in attendance 
at such agency or institution.”); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2005) (defining “student” as “any individual who 
is or has been in attendance at an educational agency or institution and regarding whom the agency 
or institution maintains education records”). See Daggett, supra note 6, at 623 (stating that “students 
do not include applicants who have not attended a school,” whether rejected or accepted but who do 
not matriculate). But cf. O’Donnell, supra note 1, at 709 n.150 (indicating that the position of the 
Family Policy Compliance Office, which administers FERPA under authority granted by 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(g), has been that records sent to a school by the applicant or by a testing service are not 
within FERPA unless and until the applicant matriculates, whereas records sent by the applicant’s 
prior school are covered whether or not the applicant matriculates). Similarly, schools are not 
required to give non-students access to their files. See id.; see also Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102 
(5th Cir. 1989) (a person is not a “student” for the purpose of gaining access to his or her admission 
files pursuant to FERPA where his or her application was rejected and he or she merely audited 
classes); United States v. Brown Univ., Civ. A. No. 91-3274, 1992 WL 2513, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 
1992) (a federal government subpoena of accepted applicants’ financial aid records who elected not 
to attend a school did not meet FERPA’s definition of “student”); Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F. 
Supp. 1020, 1026 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (an un-enrolled law student did not have standing under 
FERPA to object to a school’s refusal to release records); Osborn v. Bd. of Regents, 647 N.W.2d 
158, 172 (Wis. 2002) (concluding that production of redacted records is not prohibited by FERPA, 
so that the issue of whether application records are protected by FERPA need not be reached); 
2005] PRIVACY ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSITY APPLICATION FILES 187 
in application files protected by any general privacy norm.8 How is the 
privacy of application-file content regulated, and why? Judge Richard 
Posner has aptly described attempts to apply analytical structure to 
privacy as “a puzzle.”9 
This Article does not attempt a statement of a broad privacy right 
informed by a general normative interest, although there are normative 
aspects to what it does investigate. Rather, the point here is to evaluate 
the utility of allocation of the value of personal information in a strongly 
adhesive regime in which the personal information is solicited, and 
willingly disclosed, for a particular purpose.10 I conclude that the present 
admissions-information regime is inherently inefficient. It is costly to 
applicants because they do not know (or even know that they need to 
know) the value of what they are required to surrender, and therefore 
lose the opportunity to extract fair value for surrendering it. It is risky to 
applicants because they do not know (or have any way of learning) to 
what further and costly uses such information may be put.11 At the same 
time, the current regime is potentially costly to schools in terms of their 
admissions goals: If applicants knew, or suspected, that personal 
information revealed in application files might be put to uses they did 
not anticipate—“excessive secondary employment”12—the quantity and 
                                                           
Vandiver v. Star-Telegram, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex. App. 1988) (a recruited athlete’s 
records were not “student” records under the state’s open records law because of a lack of proof that 
the athlete enrolled at a school). 
 8. See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in 
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 383 (2003) (“Under the current law, individuals 
neither own their personal information, nor have a recognized privacy interest in it.”); Id. at 403 
(“Currently, neither property nor torts theory recognizes individuals’ rights in their information.”); 
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2000) 
(dossiers of personal information “may be used, sold, published . . . [and] that’s completely legal”); 
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2000) (“when 
the owner of a property right sells her interest to another person, that buyer can freely transfer to 
third parties” the interest so acquired); Craig D. Tindall, Argus Rules: The Commercialization of 
Personal Information, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 181, 187 (2003) (“Short of some highly 
injurious or offensive use, corporations can use personal information about customers in almost any 
manner they believe might be profitable.” (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) 652B-652E 
(1977))). 
 9. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 309 (1981). 
 10. There are many such regimes, which run the range from purchases done over the Internet, 
enrolling in supermarket and other retail discount card programs, participation in religious 
organizations, involvement in community associations, participating in events for charity (including 
making contributions), to simply joining a health club. Characteristic is a perceived high level of 
private and social utility in an enterprise with admission based on a take-it-or-leave-it set of criteria, 
including disclosure of personal information. 
 11. Where a group of parties does not know to what use their personal information will be 
put, the relationship takes on the characteristics of a “monopoly equilibrium.” Schwartz, Personal 
Health Care, supra note 2, at 49. 
 12. See id. at 31 (“An excessive disclosure norm for certain kinds of information will distort 
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accuracy of disclosed information might well decline, and some students 
might not apply at all. Finally, because applicants persistently sell their 
personal information too cheaply to schools, and because the schools do 
not bear the risk of cost attributable to excessive secondary employment 
of the applicants’ information, the schools, acting rationally, are 
incentivized to under-invest in application-file security. Schools 
choosing to employ applicant-file information to make secondary-
employment gains will free ride. 
Applicants, then, are not able to internalize the benefits of the 
information they provide schools, but do bear the cost of furnishing file 
information and the risk of excessive secondary employment of that 
information by the schools. Higher cost will reduce quality. 
I suggest in what follows that efficiency would best be served by 
reversing the present default rule, which permits secondary disclosure, in 
favor of a coercive default rule of non-disclosure, stimulating schools to 
surrender their informational advantage concerning secondary 
employment and security of application files. 
Part II describes the economics of application files and explains the 
justification for the extreme adhesiveness of the process. Part III 
discusses the limits of the efficiency of the present application-
information regime. Part IV reviews the current state of protection of 
personal information, concluding that application files receive little legal 
protection. Part V proposes that efficiency requires a new, coercive 
default rule to regulate adhesive relationships by shifting cost to the 
institutional collectors of personal information. This Article concludes 
that a rule of disclosure-based self regulation is more efficient than the 
present default disclosure rule, and more congruent with society’s 
perceived, but indistinct, privacy norm. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF APPLICATION FILES: LAYING THE APPLICANT 
BARE, FOR GOOD REASON 
Application files are a gold mine of personal information, much of 
which, in other contexts, applicants would be reluctant to reveal. As one 
observer has noted, individuals are best able to control personal 
information by not revealing it in the first instance,13 but higher-
education applicants do not have this option. The admissions process 
strictly requires, as a condition of entry into the process, the disclosure 
                                                           
or eliminate the kinds of personal information [the subjects] share in future transactions . . . .”). In 
this Article “excessive secondary employment” will be used to describe secondary employment, the 
cost or riskiness of which exceeds the subject’s gains from the initial disclosure of information. 
 13. See Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1464. 
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of personal information sufficient to lay the applicant absolutely as bare 
as possible. Schools require this for good reasons, but also simply 
because they can; the process is not regulated except by the schools 
themselves. This extremely adhesive arrangement will tend toward 
efficiency at the level of primary employment, as this Part will describe, 
but secondary employment, intended or unintended, can render the 
process inefficient, as explained in Part III. 
A. What’s at Stake? 
While the applicant is the subject of almost all of the information in 
an application file, most of that information is provided by others, 
including the applicant’s former educational institutions, present and 
past employers, writers of letters of recommendation, interviewers, 
admissions committee members, admissions staff, data assembly 
services, law enforcement agencies, and so on.14 A complete file 
contains a comprehensive record of the applicant’s experience in higher 
education and considerable information about the applicant’s personal 
life, including undergraduate grade point average (“GPA”) and class 
standing, transcripts, admissions-test scores present and past, disclosure 
and explanation of university discipline records (student disclosures in 
this respect are double-checked with their colleges) and any brushes with 
the law (not limited to criminal records—typically, any arrest beyond a 
routine traffic violation must be included, whatever the outcome), 
military-service information (such as whether a person’s discharge was 
or was not honorable), letters of “recommendation” (sometimes 
negative), the applicant’s Social Security number, the applicant’s 
addresses and telephone numbers and often those of family members, 
occasionally a photocopy of a personal check (with the applicant’s bank 
account and routing numbers on it), disclosure of membership in 
organizations, essays that are often highly personal, faculty vote sheets 
with comments, interview notes, the admissions decision itself, vote 
sheets and decisions from any unsuccessful previous attempts at 
admission, information about any health or disability issues,15 the names 
of other schools to which the applicant has applied, where the applicant 
has been accepted and at what schools the applicant has put down a seat 
deposit, and miscellaneous information of all kinds about an applicant 
                                                           
 14. See Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Important 
Thing, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 993, 994-95 (1999).  
 15. See id. Health and disability issues are regulated under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”) and regulations thereunder. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000). Because 
the IDEA is designed to work in parallel with FERPA, see 20 U.S.C.§ 1417(c) (2000), it is not 
discussed individually in this Article. 
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that finds its way into the file. Much of this material is required by the 
school and much that is not required is volunteered by the applicant or 
other contributors. The result overall is that the applicant, in the interest 
of an informed admissions decision, is laid bare (or, at least, so the 
admissions committee intends). And of course the applicant bears almost 
all of the cost of this compilation. 
Of particular significance is that all of this information is in one 
place, furnishing a one-stop-shop for those with an interest in an 
applicant’s personal information. And that place is regulated only by the 
school itself. 
The admissions procedures of institutions of higher education are 
perfectly adhesive in that they give applicants no choice but to subject 
themselves to the fixed conditions of application, including that 
applicants lay themselves bare as they run what the Supreme Court has 
characterized as “the gantlet” of admissions.16 This self-revelation is 
multiplied, of course, by the tendency of applicants to apply to more 
than one school. A recent study shows that law school applicants, for 
example, apply on average to at least four law schools, and the trend is 
headed upward.17 On average, then, each applicant is subject to multiple 
revelations, each within the context of whatever self-regulatory approach 
each school applied to has chosen to adopt. 
B. The Admissions Efficiencies of Primary Disclosure. 
Higher-education applicants are laid bare for good reasons of 
accuracy, comprehensiveness, and, in the case of professional schools, 
professional ethics. As this Part will explain, disclosure is efficient, and 
privacy is inefficient, so far as the primary employment of application 
information is concerned. 
                                                           
 16. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319 (1974). 
 17. The Law School Admission Council’s report entitled “National Applicant Trends—2004” 
notes that:  
[A]pplications per applicant ranged from 4.8 to 4.9 during the 5-year period from 1991 
through 1995 and between 4.5 and 4.7 during the 5-year period from 1996 through 2000. 
For 2001 there were 4.7 applications per applicant, but by 2004 the number had 
increased to 5.5 . . . . It seems likely that this ratio will remain high as long as applicants 
perceive that volumes are remaining high. 
LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, NATIONAL APPLICANT TRENDS–2004, at 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.lsacnet.com/lsac/data/National-Applicant-Trends.pdf. Additionally, in a brochure 
copyrighted in 1996, the State Bar of Arizona specifically advised prospective law students to apply 
to multiple law schools. The Arizona Bar continues to publish this recommendation on its official 
website at http://www.azbar.org/PublicResources/Brochures/career.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2004). 
The online brochure states that “[n]o two schools apply the same criteria equally; it therefore is 
important to apply to more than one school.” Id. 
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1. File Accuracy and Comprehensiveness: Privacy as Inefficient 
Secrecy 
Personal information is the basis of countless privately and socially 
beneficial decisions “routinely” entered into.18 Were the common law to 
protect a right to the privacy—“secrecy”—of such information, such 
decisions would be less efficient across the board, for three reasons. 
First, the transaction cost (including information cost) of negotiating 
around a default rule of privacy would render impracticable many 
transactions that would otherwise be socially beneficial.19 Second, as the 
relevant literature explains, individuals rationally attempting to 
maximize self-interest will, where possible, conceal or distort personal 
information to their advantage, leading to inaccurate, and therefore 
inefficient, decision-making.20 Finally, the subject of personal 
information—the applicant in this context—is most likely to be the 
lowest-cost provider of any personal information that is required to 
permit a transaction to go forward. Accordingly, a rule enabling privacy 
would increase information cost as an aspect of transaction cost across 
the board. Nor would privacy, applied in routine cases, avoid cost to 
subjects of personal information sufficient to justify the loss of otherwise 
socially valuable transactions.21 
The inefficiency of privacy is directly relevant to applications 
because the adhesive nature of the process mitigates an important 
information asymmetry favoring the applicant. Schools begin the 
application process with virtually no information about their applicants. 
Each applicant is therefore positioned to exercise control over their 
personal information for the very purpose of distorting the admissions 
committee’s evaluation of the applicant, leading to inefficient 
admissions decisions. 
The effect of conditioning entry into the admissions process on full 
disclosure is that the school is able to obtain an account of the 
applicant’s qualifications that is as complete and accurate as possible. 
Less information reduces the admissions committee’s ability to draw 
distinctions among applicants and therefore results in more uniform 
                                                           
 18. See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 8, at 381.  
 19. “Privacy” in this sense is control of personal information, particularly its secondary 
employment. Professor Schwartz refers to privacy in this sense as “information privacy.” Schwartz, 
Property, supra note 5, at 2058. 
 20. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397-403 (1978) 
[hereinafter Posner, Right of Privacy] (describing “privacy” as a means of concealing adverse 
personal information). 
 21. Cf. Karas, supra note 4, at 416 (“There are no adverse consequences from routine data 
collection, except for the greater volume of junk mail.”). 
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treatment.22 Sorting among applicants becomes less efficient in terms of 
bringing to bear the particular school’s admissions goals, whatever they 
may be in particular cases. Less particularized information renders the 
admissions decision more difficult (costly), and more random, increasing 
the likelihood that admissions decisions will be ill-informed (another 
cost). Reducing the amount of particularized information makes it more 
likely that resources invested in the school will not be applied according 
to whatever the applicable social goals might be in particular cases, a 
social cost. Less information, in other words, creates a market for 
lemons, with consumer valuation tending toward an average.23 
Efficiency in this sense lies in minimizing the sum of the cost of 
information-gathering and of making bad decisions. The more 
information about an applicant that is gathered by the admissions 
process, and the lower the cost to the school, the more efficient the 
process will be. Each additional piece of information gathered by the 
school renders the school marginally more observant in making its 
determinations, rendering the market in applications marginally more 
efficient. High quality applicants (“peaches”)24 are more likely to be 
identified by the school and rewarded (by acceptance and perhaps also 
by financial assistance), making the peaches more likely to apply.25 
More information tends toward optimal results, benefiting the peaches 
and the schools. 
On the presumption, then, that admission is based upon 
particularized qualifications, the more particularized the scope of 
inquiry, the better. In my role as Admissions Chair at the law school 
where I teach, I tell people, “The more we know about an applicant the 
better we like it,” and that is good economics. 
2. The Efficiency of Willing Disclosure 
Willingness of exchange suggests that each party receives 
something they value more highly than the thing they are exchanging, 
                                                           
 22. Cf. George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 623, 630 (1980) (“When it becomes more difficult to measure differences among individuals, 
their treatment becomes more uniform” with efficiency suffering as descriptions tend toward an 
average). 
 23. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). Professor Akerlof’s article famously articulates the 
economics of such circumstances in terms of the market for defective cars (“lemons”). See id. at 
489. Ill-informed consumers will willingly pay an average price for defective cars but, because they 
are ill-informed, no premium for above-average ones (“peaches”). There is accordingly no market 
for peaches. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See generally id. 
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and this is efficient26—indeed, it lies at the heart of the concept of 
economic efficiency.27 
Application file content is willingly provided and the accumulation 
of personal information from collateral sources is willingly permitted. 
This means that to the applicant, keeping the personal information in the 
file private is worth less than the opportunity to be considered for 
admission. Clearly the applicant values the opportunity to be evaluated 
for admission more highly than privacy. Every applicant makes this 
evaluation. This must be true, or the applicant would not agree to be 
subject to the highly adhesive, and intrusive, gantlet of admissions. 
3. Professional Ethics 
Finally, there is the professional ethics issue. The law school 
application process, for example, is the first filter in the assessment of a 
prospective lawyer’s character and fitness for the practice of law. 
Certainly it is much harder to get admitted to my law school if an 
applicant’s file reflects character-and-fitness issues. This is exactly the 
kind of information that law-school admissions committees want to be 
able to take into account and that applicants, rationally managing the 
stream of information about themselves, might prefer not to share. In 
this respect, the law-school admissions process may differ, at least in 
degree, from other higher-education admissions processes. 
4. Summary of Part II 
So far as first-level employment (that is, the admissions process 
itself) is concerned, cost to the applicant is assessable, consisting almost 
entirely of the out-of-pocket cost of the process and the “pure privacy 
preference”28 of keeping personal information secret from those 
involved in the process. Those who apply have determined that the 
benefit of entering the admissions process is worth more to them than 
these costs. Both school and applicant are better off than before. At the 
                                                           
 26. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common 
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488-89 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Common Law 
Adjudication] (examining different perspectives on meaning of efficiency, including Pareto and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
 27. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] (viewing efficiency as wealth-maximizing in a Kaldor-
Hicks sense, as this Article will do). 
 28. Murphy, supra note 3, at 2393-96. Privacy advocates put high value on the pure privacy 
preference. See, e.g., Tindall, supra note 8, at 191 (2003) (rather than creating “economic 
damage . . . the harm visited upon consumers by a loss of privacy is more emotional—a feeling of 
powerlessness and loss of personal security.”); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at Any Price: 
A Response to Professor Posner’s Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. REV. 429, 447 (1978). 
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first level of disclosure, then, an unencumbered flow of private facts into 
application files through a highly adhesive process is appropriately 
congruent with the general economic preference for a rule of disclosure. 
Each item of information that enters an application file makes the 
admissions decisions marginally more efficient. The school, as the 
consumer of the information, is made marginally more observant. 
Across the board, the socially beneficial application process is 
enhanced.29 In the present regime, this view prevails. Accordingly, at the 
level of first employment it is efficient for applicants to be laid as bare as 
possible. Whether it is efficient at the level of secondary employment is 
a very different issue, discussed in Part III. 
III. LIMITS ON THE EFFICIENCY OF A RULE OF DISCLOSURE IN 
ADMISSIONS FILES 
Part II concludes that, at the primary level of employment of 
applicants’ personal information, privacy is inefficient, and disclosure 
efficient. This Part discusses the likelihood that the very characteristics 
that make the highly adhesive nature of the admissions process efficient 
at the primary level of employment risk inefficiency when subjected to 
the common-law default rule of disclosure in secondary employment. 
This Part discusses relevant cause and effect, including unanticipated 
and excessive secondary disclosure, applicants’ inability to value their 
personal information, and costs to schools. 
A. The Secondary Employment of Personal Information 
According to the efficiency-informed default rule, private facts 
willingly disclosed fall within the general conclusion of the case law, 
supported by the law-and-economics literature, that cheaply available, 
accurate, personal information tends to lower transaction cost and 
enhances accurate decision making, while keeping information private 
tends to have the opposite effect.30 Economics explains that the 
secondary employment of personal information can create social value,31 
                                                           
 29. Maximizing the information about a particular applicant might well reduce that 
applicant’s chances of admission. Because that party to the admissions transaction is not made 
better off, the efficiency described here would be Kaldor-Hicks, increasing the economic value of 
social resources despite leaving some individuals worse off. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
supra note 27, at 13. 
 30. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 2382. 
 31. See, e.g., Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 20, at 394. See also Bergelson, supra note 
8, at 403. Professor Bergelson notes the “view” that “personal information is no one’s until 
collected,” analogizing this to the rule that wild animals belong to no one until captured. Id. at 403 
(citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)). Professor Bergelson’s observation is 
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a phenomenon empirically demonstrated repeatedly.32 Once personal 
information has been lawfully transmitted by its subject, its secondary 
employment by the new possessor continues to be efficient so long as it 
creates value greater than any resulting cost to the subject. Judge 
Posner’s paradigmatic example describes the sale by magazines of their 
subscription lists.33 Lists of subscribers’ addresses are “generally worth 
more to the purchasers than being shielded from possible unwanted 
solicitations is worth to the subscribers.”34 The transaction cost of 
obtaining consent of the subscribers is “high relative to the value of the 
list,” so consent is not required, putting the list into the hands that value 
it most at least cost.35 Judge Posner concludes that “we should assign the 
property right [of secondary employment] to the magazine; and the law 
does this.”36 Efficiency is served by transferring truthful personal 
information, lawfully obtained, into hands in which it is more highly 
valued than by its subjects, and where that value can be extracted at a 
cost low enough to result in a net social gain. This example is meant to 
demonstrate that, as a general proposition relating to personal 
information, social efficiency lies in a rule of disclosure. 
Supporting this conclusion of economics is the default rule that the 
parties to a transaction have the right to re-employ information acquired 
in the transaction.37 To avoid this result, the parties must bargain away 
                                                           
paralleled by the phenomenon of economics, that information has zero value in the hands of its 
subject, obtaining value only in the hands of someone who values it at greater than zero. See also 
Tindall, supra note 8, at 182, 192; Kalinda Basho, The Licensing of Our Personal Information: Is it 
a Solution to Internet Privacy?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507, 1514 (2000). 
 32. See, e.g., William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in 
Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 956 (1996) (“The annual market for mailing lists 
alone, without factoring in sales attributable to their use, has been estimated at approximately $3 
billion.”). See also Bergelson, supra note 8, at 382 n.8 (citing a study estimating that the “value of 
each name is typically worth 3 to 20 cents each time it is sold”); Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen 
A. O’Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 
777, 779 (2001) (noting that in many cases, an e-commerce company’s most valuable asset is its 
customer database). 
 33. See Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 20, at 398 (citing Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 
N.E.2d 337 (1975)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (citing Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 337). Accord Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report, 
Inc., No. 95-1318, 1996 WL 1065557, at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996) (“no property right” in 
names used in making purchases); Bergelson, supra note 8, at 403-04. 
 37. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1502 (“[B]oth sides to a transaction generally are free 
to sell details about the transaction to any interested third party.”); Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1131 
(“the traditional view in American law has been that information as such cannot be owned by any 
person. . . . Many examples illustrate that the law does not generally recognize the legal right of 
individuals to control uses or disclosures of personal data.”). Professor Samuelson considers this to 
be a disadvantage of treating personal information as property. See id. at 1138. 
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the default rule, as by entering into a non-disclosure agreement. In many 
cases, such as in the example of magazine subscriptions, to bargain away 
the default rule would be so costly as to exceed the value of the 
transaction, so that if bargaining were required, the socially valuable 
transaction would not occur. 
In the case of application files, neither the common law nor 
government regulation contradicts such a default rule.38 Nor, as a 
practical matter, can the default rule be contracted around, due to the 
combination of prohibitive transaction cost and the strongly adhesive 
applicant/school relationship. Accordingly, the contents of application 
files are not protected from opportunistic secondary employment, 
especially if they can be employed to achieve gains.39 
As detailed above, application files contain information of much 
higher value to the subject, and to others, than a mere subscription 
address. Such information, revealed to schools, may pass on into the 
datasphere, to be accumulated, catalogued, and re-employed in various 
ways to the advantage of parties other than applicants and schools. The 
applicants’ personal information is subject to becoming the property, in 
effect, of strangers, and used for the benefit of strangers.40 This can 
happen either purposefully as the school exercises its “Posnerian” 
property right in the information, or inadvertently through file leakage. 
There is incentive for this to happen because of the demand for personal 
information and fast-growing and low-cost transmission of such 
information in rapidly developing markets.41 
The foregoing scenario can be efficient if it creates social value. In 
the hands of a school, its employees, and others who are able to obtain 
                                                           
 38. In terms of state regulation, New York is the only state that appears to have addressed the 
issue of application file privacy directly. In considering a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 
request, New York’s Committee on Open Government interpreted that state’s FOIA statute to allow 
the information officer to deny access to portions of a law school applicant’s file in order to prevent 
an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See COMM. ON OPEN GOV’T, FOIL-AO-9544 (June 18, 1996) 
(citing N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87 (McKinney 2003)). Importantly, however, this decision was 
discretionary under the statute, not mandatory. See id.  
 39. See infra text accompanying note 156; Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1502. 
 40. Cf. Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2066 (observing that once personal information is 
gathered by online “spyware,” it is subject to repeated re-employment). 
 41. See, e.g., Tindall, supra note 8, at 182 (“[T]he collection and use of personal information 
[in the market] . . . will unquestionably continue at an ever-increasing rate.”). See also Karas, supra 
note 4, at 395 (describing the probable rapidity of growth of personal information databases); Id. at 
399-400 (describing the present as an “explosive time” in data marketing); Samuelson, supra note 8, 
at 1126 (“The market incentives for firms to collect and process personal data are very high.”); Id. at 
1132-33 (“Many firms collect and process personal data because of its value and because 
information technology makes the collection and use of such data so much easier and cheaper. They 
also do so because they are not forced to internalize the societal costs of private sector processing of 
personal data.”). 
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file access, application information can have value for purposes other 
than admissions. At one level, admission to an institution of higher 
education is a scarce resource. Information about its allocation, and 
influence in its operation, has value that can benefit anyone able to 
obtain file access. 
At another level, the default rule of disclosure permits schools to 
employ application-file information opportunistically. Certainly schools 
secondarily employ it to inform the admissions process generally, as 
opposed to its use in specific cases, to perform empirical analysis, for 
example. Other less obvious examples include the use of file content in 
school publicity,42 or use by the development office to identify 
applicants of interest to fund-raising targets or persons of political 
influence. At yet another level, schools literally could sell application 
file information. If magazines can retail subscribers’ addresses, there is 
little to keep schools from doing similar marketing.43 I would argue that 
all of these uses create gains for the school. Externalization of the costs 
of operating a public institution is socially valuable. 
In summary, an argument can be made that secondary employment 
of application-file information by schools is socially beneficial. The 
efficiency of secondary employment of personal information should be 
tested, however, against cost to the subject, the value to the subject of 
not having the information secondarily employed, and against its 
tendency to discourage socially beneficial actions.44 This is discussed 
next. 
B. Potential Secondary Employment Costs to Applicants 
Secondary employment of personal information in application files 
is effectively a windfall for the school that chooses to employ the 
information opportunistically. The school obtains, in addition to the 
information it requires for admissions purposes, the opportunity of 
                                                           
 42. For example, the admissions offices of universities around the country publicize the 
scores and grades of applicants who applied to their programs even if they were not admitted. This 
practice does not identify each applicant by name, but does constitute disclosure of the applicants’ 
personal information from which the schools are obtaining a benefit (by portraying the university in 
a positive light for admitting only the upper tier of the students who applied for admission). 
 43. Cf. Robert Gellman, Privacy, Consumers, and Costs: How the Lack of Privacy Costs 
Consumers and Why Business Studies of Privacy Costs are Biased and Incomplete, at 9 (2002), 
http://www.epic.org/reports/dmfprivacy.html (describing how U.S. Bancorp sold customer 
information to a telemarketing firm, including credit card numbers, credit limits, and Social Security 
numbers, consequently was sued by the Minnesota Attorney General alleging privacy breaches, and 
ultimately settled without admitting wrongdoing). Similar cases are described in Froomkin, supra 
note 2, at 1473-74. 
 44. See Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 20, at 397. 
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secondary employment unanticipated by the applicant. In a sense, then, 
the schools are not paying the full cost of the personal information they 
obtain.45 The availability of information at less than true cost will result 
in underinvestment in applicants’ privacy preferences, such as file 
security and limitations on secondary employment.46 It should also result 
in high investment in obtaining file information, but the present regime 
allocates most of the cost of assembling the file to the applicant. This 
lowers the cost of opportunistic secondary employment by the school. 
Indeed, as the cost to the school of assembling the file is attributable to 
the primary employment (the actual admission decision), secondary 
employment is costless to those schools deciding to use it 
opportunistically. Self-regulation of secondary employment permits such 
free riding, and likely does so in contradiction of the expectations of 
applicants. In short, then, schools internalize gains from primary and 
secondary employment of application-file information but externalize 
the costs of obtaining the information. Cost to the applicant, including 
information cost, plus the adhesive nature of the process, minimizes 
bargaining, probably to zero. This systematizes an incentive to 
“overuse” such information.47 
In contrast to the information windfall allocated to the schools, the 
rule of disclosure dramatically allocates to the applicants the risk and 
cost of secondary employment, whether purposeful or inadvertent. It is 
possible, of course, for secondary employment of personal information 
to be costless, or virtually costless, to subjects; consider, for example, 
Judge Posner’s magazine subscriptions. Countless consumer transactions 
in which consumers part with bits of personal information fall into this 
category.48 Secondary-employment cost to the subject can, however, 
exceed the subject’s gains from the initial, willing disclosure (hereinafter 
“excessive secondary employment”).49 Excessive secondary 
employment is almost always unanticipated, so such cost is not taken 
into account by the subject in making the initial disclosure decision. In 
light of the highly significant personal-information contained in 
application files, secondary employment, unanticipated, may well be 
                                                           
 45. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2079 (describing various market failures of the 
information markets). 
 46. Cf. id. 
 47. Cf. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA 
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998).  
 48. See, e.g., Tindall, supra note 8, at 191 (collection and re-employment of consumer 
marketing information rarely causes material “economic damage”). 
 49. See Schwartz, Personal Health Care, supra note 2, at 31 (“An excessive disclosure norm 
for certain kinds of information will distort or eliminate” future sharing of information by the 
subject). 
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excessive. 
Cost allocated to applicants will include short-term incremental 
cost, the loss of the pure privacy preference at the level of secondary 
employment, the out-of-pocket cost of the application—testing, fees and 
so on—and the private costs of undesirable revelation of the application 
itself to family or employers. While Kaldor-Hicks analysis would 
suggest that such costs are subsumed by the social benefit of the 
availability of accurate information, such private costs are nevertheless 
allocated to each applicant at that applicant’s particular marginal cost. 
This can be far higher than market value, an adversely discriminatory 
effect. 
Included in incremental cost to applicants will be cost of loss of 
control of personal information, an issue that has been catalogued in 
many places.50 For present purposes let it suffice to say that it can 
include junk mail, spam and other internet costs, and exposure to 
telemarketing.51 
Also allocated to the applicant will be high, long-term risk (e.g., 
identity theft) associated with having so much potent personal 
information gathered in one, self-regulated place.52 As Professor 
Samuelson has observed, if your car is stolen you can buy another, but 
once your personal information enters the datasphere, replacement 
privacy is not available for sale.53 Long-term risk in this context is 
particularly coupled with inadvertent secondary employment—
inappropriate file access or hacking-in to electronic files. 
In addition to purposeful secondary employment of applicant 
information by the school, failure by the school to limit application file 
access may result in unintended information leakage costly to the 
applicant, either by unauthorized or inappropriate physical access or by 
such methods as hacking into electronic files. Indeed, evidence of 
“systematic . . . unauthorized” access to student files is one of the 
                                                           
 50. See, e.g., Gelman, supra note 43, at 18-28.  
 51. See id.  
 52. This is a rapidly growing problem. For example, in less than two weeks in the spring of 
2005, three universities in California experienced security breaches concerning the personal 
information of approximately 180,000 current, former, and prospective students. Tom Zeller, Jr., 
Some Colleges Falling Short in Data Security, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, at C1. The security breach 
affecting UCLA-Berkeley involved access to the names and Social Security numbers “of nearly 
100,000 people—mostly graduate school applicants.” Id. The University of Southern California was 
also hit a few weeks later, when the personal information of 270,000 “current and former 
applicants” was compromised by a hacker who broke into a university database. Dan Carnevale, 
Computer Break-In at U. of Southern California Prompts Warning to 270,000 Applicants, THE 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 22, 2005, at A24. 
 53. Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1145 n.110. 
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reasons FERPA was enacted.54 
Adhesive self-regulation makes possible opportunistic secondary 
employment by other persons at the school who manage to gain file 
access. For example, a school-regulated environment may allocate 
opportunity to school staff to use applicants’ personal information for 
their private benefit, such as by currying favor with a spouse’s boss 
whose child is an applicant. Such uses are not unlawful; they are 
unregulated. The cost of inadvertent secondary employment is not borne 
by the school, but by the applicant. 
C. Cost to Schools 
While the self-regulated admissions regime, in the pursuit of a 
least-cost approach to information collection, allocates most incremental 
cost and virtually all risk to the applicants, the regime is inherently 
costly to schools in terms of their admissions goals and reputation. 
1. Costliness in Terms of Admissions Goals 
Secondary employment may perversely compromise desirable 
social objectives gained by primary employment. In the case of higher-
education applications, these objectives will include maximization of 
disclosure, its accuracy, and maximization of the number of qualified 
applicants. If subjects know or suspect that their willingly disclosed 
personal information is subject to excessive secondary employment they 
may distort their primary disclosure, or not make it at all.55 This result is 
inefficient in many contexts in which the costs of distortion or lost 
transactions may exceed gains. A recent study has concluded that 
                                                           
 54. See O’Donnell supra note 1, at 681 (“There has been clear evidence of frequent, even 
systematic . . . unauthorized collection of sensitive personal information and the unauthorized, 
inappropriate release of personal data” about students by schools). FERPA prohibits both access to 
student records by anyone (including school employees and officials) who lacks a “legitimate 
educational interest” in the records, see 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)-(1)(A) (2004) and oral disclosure 
of information contained in the records, see 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a)-(d) (2005) (defining “disclosure” 
as not limited to access to the records themselves). FERPA has been construed to require care to 
avoid inadvertent inappropriate access. See Daggett, supra note 6, at 632. 
 55. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: 
Losses, Gains, and Hyberbolic Discounting, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 5 
(Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti_grossklags_eis_refs.pdf [hereinafter Acquisti 
& Grossklags] (noting the consumer “defensive strategy” of falsifying information or of not 
completing transactions at all, in order to avoid accurate disclosure). Cf. Schwartz, Personal Health 
Care, supra note 2, at 31-34 (noting that unrestricted disclosure of AIDS patients’ information by 
physicians to insurance companies has led to less than forthright statements from suspecting patients 
and growth of a strong market for anonymous testing on the one hand, and, on the other, significant 
loss to insurance companies due to inaccurate physical exam reports). 
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“perceived privacy and perceived security [play] a role in the nature and 
type of information that a consumer is willing to share with a vendor,” 
and that “if consumers perceive the sharing of . . . information to be not 
so secure or private, they are unlikely to allow the acquisition and use of 
this information.”56 For example, awareness of secondary employment 
might discourage medical patients from disclosing information about 
communicable disease to their physicians.57 In the admissions context, 
schools incurring cost in terms of admissions goals must therefore 
choose among more costly methods of obtaining the required 
information, the cost of making bad decisions, and the loss of beneficial 
transactions. 
Accordingly, if applicants learn of or suspect excessive secondary 
employment they may diminish the content and accuracy of application 
information, and perhaps not apply at all. This represents the loss of a 
socially beneficial activity, against which any gains of secondary 
employment should be balanced.58 
Legal cost can also result from failure to pay attention to privacy 
concerns. Private and public lawsuits based on privacy issues are 
common.59 Clear, expectation-based rules have been shown to minimize 
such litigation.60 
2. Costliness in Terms of Reputation 
Trust has high value in the information markets. Economic research 
shows that lack of trust in vendors will lower consumer willingness to 
conclude transactions, and that privacy and security of personal 
information are key elements of trust.61 In the admissions context, this 
supports the suggestion that applicants’ lack of trust in a school’s 
application-file system will degrade application-file content and reduce 
the number of applications. 
Accordingly, secondary employment, even if not otherwise 
                                                           
 56. Ramnath K. Chellappa, Consumers’ Trust in Electronic Commerce Transactions: The 
Role of Perceived Privacy and Perceived Security 35-36, (Univ. S. Cal., Working Paper), available 
at http://asura.usc.edu/~ram/rcf-papers/sec-priv.pdf. See also Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, 
at 2 (“On the Internet, sales for billions of dollars are said to be lost every year because of 
information security fears.”). 
 57. See Schwartz, Personal Health Care, supra note 2, at 31-33. 
 58. See id.; see also Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 
408 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Economics of Privacy]. 
 59. Gellman, supra note 43, at 16. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Chellappa, supra note 56, at 34-36; Jeff Sovern, Opting Out, or No Options at All: 
The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (1999) (citing a poll 
showing that “thirty percent of Americans decided against applying for jobs, credit, or insurance 
because they did not want to reveal certain information about themselves”). 
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excessive, may entail cost to the school in terms of the appearance that 
the admissions process is not fair or that application information is not 
adequately safeguarded by the school. Unintended secondary 
employment of disclosure may occur through lack of care by the school 
in controlling accidental or purposeful file access by third parties, an 
increasing issue as information collections become increasingly 
electronic.62 Even if such inadvertent secondary employment does not 
impose cost on the applicant, if suspected or discovered by the applicant 
it would tend to degrade the content of information submitted by the 
applicant or third persons, and should entail a reputation cost to the 
school. 
3. The Risk of Governmental Regulation 
Where forces such as those described in the preceding sections 
cause private and common-law regulation to tend to inefficiency in 
persistent patterns, a case is stated for some form of government 
regulation.63 This is a significant and potentially very costly risk run in 
highly adhesive situations that fail properly to self-regulate. FERPA and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(“HIPAA”) are examples. Government regulation would be costly to 
schools in real terms and in terms of admissions goals. 
Schools’ admissions goals are highly eccentric, far too subjective to 
be suitable for one-size-fits-all regulation. The legislative absence of 
application files from FERPA suggests a conclusion that overall, the 
systemic costs of governmental regulation would be higher than the 
privacy gains to applicants. It reflects a decision to let the admissions 
process self-regulate in light of the extreme subjectivity of the 
admissions process and the eccentric values of schools.64 
FERPA-type governmental regulation allocates significant 
administrative cost to schools.65 Staff time and other resources are 
                                                           
 62. Consider, for example, the opening scene of this Article: The Princeton admissions 
department famously gained access to Yale’s digital admissions files using applicants’ personal 
information from Princeton’s own application files. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 63. Indeed, statutory intervention has been called for in both the scholarly literature, see, for 
example, Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2100, 2127-28, as well as in practice. See S. 116, 
109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by Dianne Feinstein); H.R. Res. 1848, 108th Cong. (2003) 
(introduced by Robert E. Andrews).  
 64. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the broad range of discretion accorded to 
university admissions committees. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-30 (2003); 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J., referring to the “range of 
factors a university properly may consider”); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 325 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“the educational policy choices confronting a university admissions 
committee are not ordinarily a subject for judicial oversight”).  
 65. See Daggett, supra note 6, at 660-62 (discussing “burdens . . . imposed” by FERPA). 
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required for compliance and monitoring, and systems must be 
appropriately adjusted.66 As the record of decided cases shows, 
considerable resources must be expended on legal advice and lawsuits. 
One commentator has observed that the “greatest burden [FERPA] 
places on schools is dealing with its conflicts with other laws.”67 It has 
been noted that lawyers representing colleges and universities spend “an 
inordinate amount of time deciphering” FERPA.68 This is partly because 
FERPA, like most statutory schemes, is fixed in terms of its written 
provisions which in turn were limited to what seemed possible and 
desirable at the time of its passage. Accordingly, there are gaps in 
FERPA, emphasized by the lack of clarity of the relevant United States 
Supreme Court decisions.69 
D. Summary 
This Part has explained that secondary employment of application-
file information by schools can create value, much like the subscription 
lists exploited by Judge Posner’s magazine publishers. The resulting 
externalization of cost will be socially efficient so long as cost to the 
applicant—both actual, and perceived by the applicant—is sufficiently 
low. But secondary employment can be excessively costly to both 
applicant and school. Indeed, actions by a school that degrade 
information provided by applicants will force the school to choose 
between the costs of doing their own research or the risk of making bad 
decisions. Excessive secondary employment proceeds directly from the 
common-law default rule of disclosure. This demonstrates a tension in 
the rule and suggests that a perfectly general rule of disclosure is not 
efficient across the board. Indeed, in the admissions context a rule of 
disclosure allocating a right of secondary employment may never be 
efficient, on account of the information asymmetry disadvantaging the 
applicants. The next Part describes the failure of the common law of tort 
and contract to protect against this result. 
                                                           
 66. See id. at 660. 
 67. Id. at 667-69. 
 68. O’Donnell, supra note 1, at 679. 
 69. See id.; Randi M. Rothberg, Not as Simple as Learning the ABC’s: A Comment on 
Owasso Independent School District No. I-011 v. Falvo and the State of the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 27 (2002); Daniel R. Dinger, Johnny Saw My 
Test Score, So I’m Suing My Teacher, Falvo v. Owasso School District, Peer Grading, and a 
Student’s Right to Privacy Under the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 
575 (2001). 
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IV. PROTECTION OF APPLICATION FILE INFORMATION 
Society holds an indistinct normative perception that personal 
information should be protectable, at least some of the time. This is 
reflected in the motley patchwork of legislated privacy regulation,70 and 
                                                           
 70. See, e.g., Tindall, supra note 8, at 190-91; Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1144-45; Daniel J. 
Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 967, 971-72 (a “panoply of federal and state statutes.” See generally Tindall, supra note 8, at 
181 n.60; Bergelson, supra note 8, at 391 (citing the piecemeal implementation of regulations). The 
legislation includes: Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2000); Children’s Internet Protection Act 
of 2000, 20 U.S.C. § 7001 (2000); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2000), amended 
by Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2002); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2000); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); 
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002 § 311(a), 115 Stat. 
833 (2001) (requiring that “no recipient of funds made available in this Act shall disseminate 
personal information obtained by a State department of motor vehicles in connection with a motor 
vehicle record”); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (2000); Electronic 
Funds Transfer Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2000); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681 (2000); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2000); Fair Debt Collections Practices 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g (2000); Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6801 (2000); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000); Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000); 
Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2000); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1976, 12 
U.S.C. § 3401 (2002) (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to disclosure of 
financial records by banks to governmental agencies); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 251 (2003) (offering limited protection to customers’ proprietary information); Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2003) (protecting individuals’ privacy against 
unwanted phone solicitation); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000) (providing 
procedural requirements for sharing financial information among federal agencies); Telemarketing 
and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1991, 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000); Video Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); CAL. VEH. CODE § 1808.45 (2001) (stating that a 
right to privacy protects personal information given by individuals to Department of Motor 
Vehicles); GA. CODE ANN. 40-3-23(e) (2004) (“Personal information of any registrant, including 
name, address, date of birth, or driver’s license or social security number, shall not be furnished or 
transferred by or to any person . . .”); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 66A, § 2(c) (2002) (forbidding 
“any other agency or individual not employed by the holder [from having] access to personal data” 
unless it is for purposes of medical treatment, application to professional licenses, special 
investigation bureau, or for detection of fraud and control); MO. REV. STAT. § 32.091(2) (2001) 
(prohibiting Department of Revenue from disclosing personal information collected “without 
express consent given by the person to whom such information pertains”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-
3-101(8) (2003) (prohibiting Montana Department of Motor Vehicles from furnishing personal 
information for public inspection); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (amending 
South Carolina law to prohibit dissemination of veterans’ discharge records for commercial uses). 
Cf. Randy Cohen, The Ethicist, Dead to Rights?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sept. 5, 2004, at 20 (reporting 
that a young woman feels it would “cause trouble” for her to report adverse information confided to 
her by a teenager). The author’s view is that such information should be reported if it would prevent 
injury. See id. In this example, a perceived norm of privacy conflicts with the efficient common-law 
rule against privacy in personal information. 
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in many polls and surveys. Professor Paul Schwartz, relying on a Harris 
Equifax poll of public understanding of data protection, observes that a 
strong majority of those polled felt that “individuals have lost 
control . . . of personal information.”71 According to Professor Schwartz, 
“most individuals believe that they deserve fair information practices 
that structure the terms by which others . . . gain access” to personal 
information willingly disclosed.72 These observations describe 
majoritarian expectations reflecting a notion of exchange.73 “Fair 
information practices” informing a Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare 1973 report on automated retention of personal information74 
and international privacy laws similarly include employment of personal 
information in ways limited to fulfillment of the purposes for which the 
information was collected and reasonable security safeguards.75 
This may be especially true in circumstances such as application 
files, where social institutions require the revelation of important 
personal information in a highly adhesive relationship established for 
reasons of high social value. In light of this perceived (albeit indistinct) 
norm, does the common law protect application file content? This Part 
                                                           
 71. Schwartz, Personal Health Care, supra note 2, at 42. Professor Bergelson cites a poll in 
which participants “ranked privacy just behind the freedom of speech and ahead of the freedom of 
religion and the right to vote as the most important American right.” Bergelson, supra note 8, at 427 
n.255. Bergelson provides a list of other polls which reach similar conclusions. See id. at 428 n.260 
(citing an EPIC public opinion poll on privacy, an article by Humphrey Taylor, an article by Marlon 
Manuel, and an IBM-Harris multi-national consumer privacy survey). See also Mike Hatch, The 
Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from Commercial Interests 
in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1476-81 (2001) (listing polls and surveys); 
Sovern, supra note 61, at 1057 (listing polls and surveys). 
 72. Schwartz, Personal Health Care, supra note 2, at 44. 
 73. Accord Murphy, supra note 3, at 2416 (“[P]rivacy rules are in fact implied contractual 
terms.”). Professor Jessica Litman has described an indistinct norm of privacy in terms of 
individuals’ expectations and public adverse response to revelations of certain commercial programs 
of collection and resale of private facts. See Litman, supra note 8, at 1304-11. Litman, emphasizing 
individuals’ foreseeable expectations of the secondary employment of disclosed private facts, 
suggests a breach-of-trust approach growing out of the norm. See id.; see also supra notes 27-28 
and accompanying text. 
 74. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF 
CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PERSONAL RECORD DATA 
SYSTEMS (1973), available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm 
[hereinafter HEW report]. The HEW Report recommends a Code of Fair Information Practice based 
on “five basic principles”: There should be no secret systems for keeping personal information 
records; an individual must be able to know what’s in their file and how it’s being used; an 
individual must be able to prevent secondary employment of their personal information; an 
individual must be able to correct erroneous personal information; and an information-collecting 
organization must assure reliability of data for intended uses and take precautions to prevent misuse. 
Id. at 1. The Summary and Recommendations section of the report characterizes information 
collection as “trading” and concludes that “both parties to the exchange should participate in setting 
the terms.” Id. 
 75. See Gellman, supra note 43, at 5-6. 
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reviews the limited ways in which the common law protects personal 
information. It will show that the protective nexus is not a norm of 
privacy but rather a focus on how personal information comes into the 
hands of parties other than the subject, and on what use is made of it 
afterward. Privacy, in the sense of being “let alone,”76 or keeping secrets, 
or the subject’s control of secondary employment, is not the informing 
value of such regulation as there is; rather, the informing value is the 
wrongfulness under other norms77 of either the act of obtaining personal 
information or of re-employing it. As will be seen, the present state of 
common-law regulation offers little protection to application-file 
content. 
A. Protection of Private Facts: The Common Law 
Given that the common law allocates the risk of excessive 
secondary employment to the applicant, does the common law protect 
application-file information? Ownership of information is regulated by 
the courts through the common law, and the application of stare decisis 
normalizes judge-made regulation. The common law has largely 
disfavored a right of privacy in truthful, legally obtained personal 
information78 outside of relationships of trust and confidence.79 In 
particular, it gives little protection to private facts.80 
In terms of secondary employment by schools, common-law 
protection is very slight. Under the common-law default rule of 
disclosure, speaking generally, “facts about people” are not protected.81 
The manner of obtaining facts about people is regulated, but only to the 
extent that it inflicts cost by altering the subject’s behavior.82 Secrets 
                                                           
 76. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
 77. See Bergelson, supra note 8, at 394 (courts have “refused to recognize the plaintiffs’ 
[privacy] claims since they did not fit under the existing categories of protected interests”); see also 
infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 20, at 399. 
 79. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985) (quoting authority 
for the proposition that the relationship supporting a tort of breach of confidence is one customarily 
including a duty of confidence); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON 
TORTS 121 (5th ed. 1984). Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1999); MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6 (1999). 
 80. See., e.g., Litman supra note 8, at 1304 (concluding that “the invasion of privacy tort is 
too narrowly defined to serve” as a “solution to the problem of personal data privacy”); id. at 1311 
(“Current tort law does not offer much protection for an individual’s data privacy.”). 
 81. Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 20, at 404. 
 82. See id. The use of “intrusive surveillance” to obtain facts about people is appropriate only 
to law enforcement, according to Judge Posner. See id.; see also infra notes 104-108 and 
accompanying text (demonstrating limits on even First Amendment-protected newsgathering). 
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representing the application of superior knowledge or skills are protected 
against revelations that might discourage socially valuable conduct, a 
general result permitting commercial enterprises to keep secrets for 
commercial advantage.83 These general results are described by Judge 
Posner as the parameters of a “legal right of privacy based on economic 
efficiency,”84 an economics-informed norm. The common law protection 
of information conveyed in the context of a relationship of trust and 
confidence, while extended to students,85 has not been extended to the 
applicant/school relationship.86 
Modern analysis of common-law privacy rights in this country 
famously began with The Right to Privacy, the Warren and Brandeis 
article published in 1890.87 The article articulates a broad norm of 
privacy, affirming in personal information a “right of property in its 
widest sense,” with remedies in tort.88 Warren and Brandeis’ powerful 
normative argument found wide scholarly acceptance89 and a place in 
the first Restatement of Torts.90 Attempts to apply their argument 
experienced rough sledding in the courts, however. The narrowness of 
the degree of acceptance of privacy as a protectable interest was 
delineated by Dean William Prosser in his 1960 exegesis of the cases.91 
Dean Prosser sorted the cases into the four now-familiar categories of 
intrusion of an unreasonable and offensive nature,92 public disclosure of 
                                                           
 83. See Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 20, at 404. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Bridges v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc., 201 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“Unquestionably, the schools and the students enjoy a special relationship of trust.”) (quoting 
Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 86. See, e.g., Ian Goldberg et al., Trust, Ethics, and Privacy, 81 B.U. L. REV. 407 (2001); 
Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635 (2001); 
see also Litman, supra note 8, at 1284-86, 1304-11. 
 87. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 76. 
 88. Id. at 210-11. Property rights continue to be put forward as a vehicle for protection of 
private facts. See e.g., Bergelson, supra note 8; Schwartz, Property, supra note 5; George P. Smith, 
II, The Extent of Protection of the Individual’s Personality Against Commercial Use: Toward a New 
Property Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2002); Sovern, supra note 61. The movement to protect privacy 
through property rights has achieved little success in the courts. See Litman, supra note 8.  
 89. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at 850 (following publication of the Warren and 
Brandeis article, “no other tort has received such an outpouring of comment in advocacy of its bare 
existence.”). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939). 
 91. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see generally KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 79, at 849-69. 
 92. This tort relates to methods of obtaining information that “would be offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable person.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at 855. Judge Posner 
describes it as “obtaining of personal information by intrusive means,” and gives as examples 
interfering with a person’s “movements” and eavesdropping. Posner, Economics of Privacy, supra 
note 58, at 408. 
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embarrassing private facts, publicity placing the subject in a “false 
light,”93 and appropriation, for financial gain, of a subject’s name or 
likeness.94 These categories, accepted in the Second Restatement95 
(hereinafter “Restatement”), furnish the present common-law analytical 
framework of a protectable interest in privacy. 
Of the Restatement’s four categories, two are of manifest 
significance to the present topic: intrusion96 and private facts.97 Private 
facts will be discussed first. 
1. The Restatement Private Facts Tort 
Private facts have received little common-law protection.98 Three 
main themes run through the literature describing the failure of the 
private-facts tort to achieve broad acceptance: The tort’s inconsistency 
with constitutionally protected rights of speech and publication, its 
ambiguity in terms of what constitutes a protectable interest, and 
economic inefficiency. These threads are woven against a background of 
privacy interests so widely various as to defeat any clear articulation of a 
unifying theme of protectability. 
Once acquired by a person other than the subject, personal 
information can be re-employed in multiple ways, including as gossip, as 
data informing such criminal acts as identity theft, as lawfully acquired 
tidbits that, in the aggregate, can create value (magazine publishers 
aggregating and selling subscription lists, for example), as subject matter 
to attract buyers to the popular press, and in numberless other ways in 
which value (either financial or in the form of personal satisfaction) can 
accrue to a new possessor and cost (ranging from a mere personal 
preference for privacy to identity theft) to the subject. These extremely 
varied interests and conflicting claims on the value inherent in private 
                                                           
 93. This tort is said to protect against knowingly false publications of a nature “highly 
offensive” to a reasonable person. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at 865. 
 94. This tort is oriented toward preventing another from benefiting economically from the use 
of a subject’s name or likeness without permission; the cases relate to uses in advertising. See 
Posner, Economics of Privacy, supra note 58, at 408. 
 95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 96. “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Id. at § 652B. 
 97. “One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Id. at 
§ 652D. 
 98. See Posner, Economics of Privacy, supra note 58, at 408 (“Examination of the cases 
shows . . . that the right is upheld in very few cases.”); G. Michael Harvey, Comment, 
Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2403-21 
(1992). 
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facts seem to have precluded articulation of a unifying normative theme. 
The Restatement formulation as employed in the courts describes 
the “private facts” tort as limited to facts which, while truthful, are ones 
as to which “publicity” would be “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”99 
As to its “publicity” prong, the private-facts tort described in the 
Restatement does not relate to how private facts are obtained—that is 
confined to the “intrusion” tort, discussed next—but to re-disclosure, or 
secondary employment. Lawfully obtained private facts are protected 
from only a single manner of re-disclosure, “giv[ing] publicity,” in the 
Restatement’s words.100 The Restatement’s definition of publicity is 
communication to the “public at large” or re-employment in such a way 
as to be “substantially certain to become . . . public knowledge,”101 
which, in a practical sense, is most likely to apply to repetition by the 
news media. Attempts to prove in court a tort so delineated have largely 
failed.102 This failure is attributable in part to conflict with 
constitutionally protected speech: According to Justice White, Supreme 
Court speech-rights analysis has “oblieterate[d]” the possibility of 
protecting private facts from publication in the Restatement sense, so 
long as the information is lawfully obtained.103 It is further attributable 
to ambiguity.104 Even if these obstacles are overcome, no action lies if 
the matter publicized is “of legitimate public concern,”105 that is, 
                                                           
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (“It is only when the publicity . . . is 
such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, that the cause 
of action arises.”). 
 100. The word “publicity” is used both in the title section, “Publicity Given to Private Life,” 
and in the text. Id. at § 652D cmt. a. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration 
of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425 (1996); Bergelman, supra note 8, at 394-400. 
 103. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 550 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). 
 104. By far, most reported cases (and therefore much of the law) involving attempts to protect 
personal information involve publication of such information in a manner implicating the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., Eric W. Tiritilli, You Never Call Me Anymore: Bartnicki v. Vopper and the 
Supreme Court’s Abridgement of the Right of Privacy in Favor of the First Amendment Right of a 
Free Press, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729 (2003); Mintz, supra note 102; Sean M. Scott, The Hidden 
First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from 
Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1117 (2000); Harvey, supra note 98, at 2401-22 
(describing “the death of the private facts tort”). In the few cases reaching the United States 
Supreme Court, constitutionally protected speech has always outweighed a personal interest in 
privacy. See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524; Smith 
v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); 
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d. Warren and Brandeis themselves 
carve out from protection the “publication” of facts “of public or general interest.” Warren & 
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“newsworthy,” as the literature has it.  
The Restatement, by its terms, does not describe a tort protective of 
private facts based on “publication” in the sense of simple repetition, as 
distinguished from “publicity.”106 A few cases recognize such a tort by 
bending the Restatement’s limitation to publicity “to the public at 
large,”107 but these few cases lean strongly on a perceived norm of 
outrage in particular cases. Any more-general recognition has been 
defeated by the aforementioned obstacles of subjectivity of valuation, 
and ambiguity.108 This is probably as the Restatement intends. 
Some cases take the view that willing disclosure of information by 
the subject to another, or to a small group, does not necessarily mean 
that private facts cease being private.109 Most such cases contain strong 
elements of contract or confidential relationships, however.110 They also 
manifest elements of subjective, rather than objective, outrage, 
demonstrated by the plaintiff’s suffering.111 
Private facts in this sense are protected not as property—as Warren 
and Brandeis would have it—but according to a vague norm of 
offensiveness, tested objectively, the “highly offensive” prong of the 
Restatement description. The Restatement illuminates this norm using 
terms including “highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man,”112 
“mores of the community,”113 and “common decency.”114 These terms 
                                                           
Brandeis, supra note 76, at 214. 
 106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & 
MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 90 (1972).  
 107. KEETON ET AL., supra note 79, at 856-57. 
 108. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Private Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 337 (1983) (courts avoid the “legal tangle” of 
subjecting “gossip to liability”); see also Steven I. Katz, Comment, Unauthorized Biographies and 
Other “Books of Revelations”: A Celebrity’s Legal Recourse to a Truthful Public Disclosure, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 815, 816 (1989) (gossip among individuals “cannot practically speaking be the basis 
of a cause of action . . .”). 
 109. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975) (disclosure to a 
reporter of private facts for which consent to republication was expressly withdrawn does not render 
the facts public); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) 
(subject disclosing personal information in connection with a criminal investigation does not 
thereby render the information public). Cf. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1990) (“publicity” does not require general publication; publication of fact of mastectomy to 
fellow employees was sufficient). 
 110. Cf. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1127 (consent to republish withdrawn); Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 902 
(breach of understanding of confidence by employer’s staff nurse). 
 111. See, e.g., Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 902 (plaintiff whose mastectomy was disclosed to co-
workers alleged “severe physical, mental and emotional distress” and took early retirement).  
 112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c. 
 113. Id. at § 652D cmt. g. 
 114. Id. at § 652D cmt. h. 
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have been criticized as “so conceptually vague that they offer little 
guidance,”115 and as being “hopelessly ambiguous.”116 
Clearly, the private-facts tort in the common law does not protect 
application file information except in the most narrow of circumstances. 
Certainly it does not provide any deterrent or remedy that would be 
generally applicable.117 
2. The Restatement Intrusion Tort 
The intrusion tort is not designed to control content, but the manner 
in which information is acquired. Under the Restatement version, one 
who obtains private facts “intrusively” within the meaning of the tort has 
committed a wrong even if the information is never re-disclosed.118 
“Intrusion” requires that two elements be shown: Intrusion upon the 
“solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs,” in a manner 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person,”119 an objective standard. 
Other renditions of the tort differ slightly.120 Generally speaking, 
information voluntarily surrendered fails the “intrusion” prong, and 
widely available information fails the “highly offensive” prong.121 
Whether a particular example of information gathering constitutes 
intrusion is highly problematic.122 Compare, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,123 with Judge Posner’s 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 
                                                           
 115. Zimmerman, supra note 108, at 301. 
 116. Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 
1890-1900, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1171 (1992). 
 117. See Bergelson, supra note 8, at 408 (requirement of publication “more or less disqualifies 
this tort as a possible cause of action for plaintiffs attempting to control the use and transfer of their 
personal information”). 
 118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmts. a-b.  
 119. Id. at § 652B. 
 120. See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 8, at 406 (citing authority for a four-element test: “(i) an 
unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion; (ii) which is offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable person; (iii) as to a matter which is private; and (iv) which has caused 
anguish and suffering”); Scott Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect 
Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1756, 1778 (1995) 
(describing a three-part test: “the intrusion must (1) be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (2) 
be intentional; and (3) occur in a place where the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
 121. See Shorr, supra note 120, at 1778-79. 
 122. In the news-gathering context, the act of gathering is not as strongly constitutionally 
protected as is publication. “Newsworthiness” is a “complete bar to liability for publication of 
private facts,” but the news gatherer’s “right to intrude” receives much more limited protection. 
Only depriving news gatherers of “indispensable tools” is protected. Shulman v. Group W Prods., 
Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 496 (Cal. 1998) (citing Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 
1971)). 
 123. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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Inc.
124 Both cases involve news-gatherers visiting the plaintiffs’ 
premises under false pretenses and surreptitiously obtaining tapes and 
photos. In Dietemann the Ninth Circuit had “little difficulty” in deciding 
that the reporters’ actions “warrant[ed] recovery for invasion of privacy 
in California.”125 In Desnick, by contrast, Judge Posner, writing for the 
court, found no intrusion upon seclusion. The difference, he explained, 
was that the reporters in Dietemann entered the plaintiff’s home on a 
purported social visit, while in Desnick the reporters entered the 
plaintiff’s place of business for the purported purpose of a medical 
examination. According to Judge Posner, in Desnick there was “no 
invasion . . . of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks 
to protect . . . nor was there any ‘inva[sion of] a person’s private 
space.’”126 Notably, Judge Posner’s analysis of “intrusion” was strongly 
linked to a norm of trespass. 
Analytically the intrusion cases rely heavily on reasonable 
expectations and the closely related notion of “custom.”127 Courts have 
protected privacy expectations in houses and ambulances.128 In Desnick 
the space held not to be protected was the plaintiff’s place of business, 
where customarily, the public was invited.129 
It has been held that “seclusion” does not mean absolute 
seclusion.130 Indeed, “[t]he mere fact that a person can be seen by 
someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be 
forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.”131 
The second prong of the Restatement intrusion tort is that the 
intrusion must be “highly offensive” in an objective sense.132 The cases 
do not draw a strong distinction between what’s intrusive and what’s 
                                                           
 124. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 125. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 248. 
 126. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352 (citing DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 146, 149 (Mich. 1881) 
(physician held liable when he brought a non-physician friend along to a patient’s home to witness a 
birth)). 
 127. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490, 491 (Cal. 1998) (“[W]e 
are aware of no law or custom permitting the press to ride in ambulances or enter hospital rooms 
during treatment without the patient’s consent.” The plaintiff could “reasonably have expected” 
conversations in the ambulance to be private.); Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249 (“Plaintiff’s den was a 
sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude eavesdropping newsmen.”). 
 128. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352. 
 130. See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 8, at 406 (“The intrusion does not have to be of a 
physically defined place.”). 
 131. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10[A][2], 5-120.1 (1998), as adopted by 
Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490 (holding that surreptitiously taping the plaintiff’s conversations with co-
workers violated the plaintiff’s right of seclusion)). 
 132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
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highly offensive. Once intrusion is found, high outrage seems to follow. 
In Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.,133 for example, the court (in a 
summary judgment context) held that a newsperson’s entry into an air 
ambulance was intrusion (based on a reasonable expectation of privacy) 
and that taping and filming the plaintiff was sufficient that “a jury could 
find . . . filming in the air ambulance, to be ‘highly offensive to a 
reasonable person’” and to show “highly offensive disrespect for the 
patient’s personal privacy.”134 
Is access to application files intrusion? In the higher education 
context, intrusion is not relevant to primary disclosure of application-file 
information, because it is willing as to the subject. It is probably not 
relevant even to secondary disclosure by the schools, for failure of the 
intrusion prong.135 In at least one case, a clear example of excessive 
secondary employment, disclosure of personal medical information was 
held to be an “invasion of privacy.”136 The analysis is akin, however, to 
protection within a relationship of trust and confidence—again, the 
content of the wrong being a link to an existing norm, not a norm of 
privacy. 
Where intrusion may be relevant in the admissions context is in the 
access to files by persons from whom the applicant has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. These would almost certainly be intruders not 
part of the university community. As I understand the current regime, 
the applicant has little expectation of privacy with respect either to 
disclosure (file access) to university staff or to purposeful secondary 
employment. Intrusion has been significantly limited in the cases in 
ways that reduce its deterrent function in the context of application files. 
The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has held that “there can 
be no invasion of privacy where the information sought . . . has been 
                                                           
 133. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).  
 134. Id. at 494-95.  
 135. Cf. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 144-51 (2000) (holding valid the amended Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act of 1994, allowing for secondary disclosure when a driver “opts-in” to such 
disclosure); Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, No. 04-13306, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18406, at *1-
23 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2005); In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(holding compliance with subpoenas issued under Digital Millenium Copyright Act paramount to 
consent to disclosure of information); Schuchart v. La Taberna del Alabardero, Inc., 365 F.3d 33, 36 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (recognizing that some states find liability when disclosure exceeds scope of 
consent); In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (interpreting a statutory consent 
exception to disclosure protection under the Electronic Commucations Privacy Act as contingent on 
the scope fo the consent given by the subject). 
 136. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 760 N.E.2d 724, 729 (Mass. 2002) (recognizing 
that “disclosure of confidential medical information . . . can constitute an actionable tort, or an 
invasion of privacy”); Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1426, 1441 (1982); Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician’s Tort Liability for Unauthorized 
Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R. 4th 668, 680 (1986). 
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voluntarily revealed to others.”137 Intrusion has also been held not to lie 
as to those who secondarily obtained and made use of information 
obtained by others.138 
In short, applicant-file information is not meaningfully protected by 
the common-law privacy torts. The subject matter of the recognized torts 
is too limited, and even they provide almost no ex ante deterrence or ex 
post compensation.139 As Professor Schwartz observes, in some 
instances “litigation for privacy violations under a tort theory has 
foundered because courts determined that the actual harm that the 
plaintiffs suffered was de minimis.”140 He further observes that personal 
information “may not have a high enough market value to justify the 
costs of litigation.”141 This won’t be true in all cases, of course—
consider the “market value” of identity theft—but it may well be the 
case in a sufficient preponderance of cases to prevent development of a 
viably protective tort remedy with its inevitable cost effects. 
Finally, so long as schools preserve their adhesive, asymmetrical 
grip on information about secondary employment, it is simply unlikely 
that applicants will discover these uses and be able to prove the 
requisites of the Restatement privacy torts.142 As one observer has put it, 
“the privacy tort seems structurally incapable of securing . . . control 
over personal information.”143 
B. Protection of Private Facts: Contract 
While it has been argued that contract could provide a basis for 
protecting private facts,144 in the present admissions regime contract 
does not provide a satisfactory basis. One reason is that applicants are 
“privacy myopic”—they are not aware of the market value of their 
personal information and therefore are not aware of the risk of its 
                                                           
 137. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. 1970) The court held that 
“[i]nformation about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as 
private” and that the plaintiff would “necessarily assume the risk” of re-publication. Id. at 770. 
Accord Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (use of plaintiff 
cardholder’s personal information revealed by use of the card is not intrusion). But see Sanders, 978 
P.2d at 69 (a reporter’s surreptitious taping of plaintiff’s conversations with co-workers intruded 
upon plaintiff’s seclusion). 
 138. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting that newspaper 
writers who accepted and used copies of documents they knew had been wrongfully obtained not 
liable for invasion of privacy). 
 139. See Tindall, supra note 8, at 191. 
 140. Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2108. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Cf. Shorr, supra note 120, at 1791-92. 
 143. Id. at 1794. 
 144. See, e.g., id. at 1834-50. 
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secondary employment. Meaningful bargaining is obviated by 
information cost. The other is that, even if meaningful bargaining were 
available, transaction cost would degrade the efficiency of the present 
admissions regime. These two points are discussed in order below. 
1. The Failure of Accurate Valuation: “Privacy Myopia” 
Consumers generally are said to be “privacy myopic.”145 Professor 
Froomkin employs this term to describe consumers’ persistence in 
undervaluing personal information, valuing it at its marginal value to 
themselves rather than at its (higher) value in the marketplace for 
personal information.146 Such undervaluation results in over-disclosure 
by subjects,147 assuring a market among those seeking to capture the 
valuation differential. As a result, consumers part with personal 
information “too often and too cheaply.”148 This is related to the well-
documented tendency of individuals to underinsure low-probability, 
high-risk future events.149 
As noted elsewhere in this Article,150 society holds an indistinct 
notion valuing privacy, an indistinct norm based on a privacy preference. 
Privacy myopia demonstrates that individuals’ actions do not comport 
with the norm.151 Studies show that consumers part with personal 
information often and cheaply even when they claim to value privacy.152 
Thus, “privacy myopic” has been used to described a person who, “even 
if she professes to appreciate privacy, does not take actions to protect 
herself . . . .”153 
Failure of a person professing a privacy preference to self-protect—
parting with personal information too often and too cheaply—may be 
based on a number of factors relevant in the present context, including 
                                                           
 145. Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1502.  
 146. Id. at 1503. See also Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 3 (“[E]ven privacy 
concerned individuals are willing to trade-off privacy for convenience or to bargain the release of 
very personal information in exchange of relatively small rewards.”). 
 147. Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1504. 
 148. Id. at 1502. Accord Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 3 (citing studies showing 
that “even privacy concerned individuals are willing to trade-off privacy for convenience or to 
bargain the release of very personal information in exchange of relatively small rewards”); Tindall, 
supra note 8, at 187 (“Consumers appear to be perfectly willing to offer businesses a startling 
amount of private information.”).  
 149. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 11.  
 150. See Murphy, supra note 3.  
 151. See, e.g., Karas, supra note 4, at 420, 421 (“Although consumers tend to voice concerns 
about privacy, they routinely part with personal data . . . [they] simply tend to value the convenience 
of online shopping and marginal financial gain over the potential privacy threats of data 
collection.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 61, at 1067-94. 
 153. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 12. 
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lack or asymmetry of information, bounded rationality (“rational 
ignorance”), and market behavior focused on “short-term factors.”154 
Incomplete information is clearly a factor influencing disclosure in 
the admissions context. Applicants do not know everything that’s in 
their files. It is worth remembering in this respect that applicants don’t 
provide all of the information in their files. Instead, they permit a 
collection of information about themselves to be compiled from a variety 
of sources. Applicants cannot assess the value of the collection 
accurately because they do not know all that’s in it, and with respect to 
some items they are aware of, such as letters of recommendation, they 
are prevented from learning the content. 
Even if applicants did know of everything in their files, they would 
not know how to value it because they cannot predict risk.155 They don’t 
know what a particular school’s file security is like or what its intentions 
are relative to secondary employment. In short, applicants are 
dramatically subject to information asymmetry.156 The present 
application process cannot be analyzed in terms of a fully rational 
model. 
Accordingly, applicants cannot accurately assess disclosure risk. 
For this reason if no other, self-protection through bargaining is 
unavailable. 
Further, in the highly adhesive context of admissions, the 
possibility of negotiating with schools over disclosure likely never 
occurs to applicants. In a sense, a transaction is taking place in which 
one party, the applicants, are not aware that bargaining is a possibility, 
much less that the information they supply might be further employed.157 
Closely related to information asymmetry are the effects of 
bounded rationality. The unpredictability of the complex effects, and 
costs, of unanticipated secondary employment of personal information 
defeats cost-benefit assessment. The cost of protection, including 
prediction, calculation, and negotiation might well be perceived by 
applicants as higher than the foreseeable cost of loss of privacy. 
Accordingly, applicants do not make the attempt.158 The valuation 
process itself is costly, and indeed I would suggest prohibitively costly 
                                                           
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1145 (observing difficulty of “the average person to 
judge the risks of selling her property rights in personal data”). 
 156. See Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2081 (describing information asymmetry as a 
problem in privacy markets). 
 157. Cf. id. at 2078 (characterizing such a situation as an “extreme illustration of privacy 
market failure”). 
 158. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 9-10. Professor Schwartz characterizes this as a 
consumer’s “general inertia toward default terms.” Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2081.  
2005] PRIVACY ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSITY APPLICATION FILES 217 
in light of all the possibilities that must be taken into account, so that 
privacy myopia may in fact largely consist of short-term cost avoidance. 
Applicants’ unlikelihood of incurring the cost of risk assessment 
seems particularly likely should applicants take a short-term view of 
risk. Market behaviors focusing on the short term may result in acts 
inconsistent with professed privacy preferences. A short-term focus can 
overcome a perception that risk is high but long-term and low-
probability.159 In the case of applicants, the opportunity to enter the 
admissions market might well represent a well-defined, high value, but 
short-term benefit that overcomes a more strategic analysis of privacy 
risk. 
In some cases the weighing of secondary-employment cost and the 
assessment of socially beneficial actions simply do not come into play 
because the requirement of self-disclosure is so highly adhesive that a 
subject motivated to apply has no choice. They must accept the school’s 
conditions, or relinquish the opportunity to apply. Again, health care 
disclosures are an example,160 and so in many cases are school 
applications. In this respect, highly adhesive privacy regimes are 
inherently inefficient. 
Of course, even a rational, perfectly informed consumer faced with 
zero transaction cost will exchange personal information for something 
they value more highly.161 
All of the foregoing factors will contribute to both an inability to 
bargain and a possible lack of motivation to bargain,162 reducing the 
possibility of an applicant self-protecting with respect to application-file 
information. Again, the transmission of personal information through the 
admissions process does not operate within a fully rational model. This 
suggests that market correction is not available. 
The magazine-subscription example, accordingly, is probably not 
applicable to secondary employment of application-file content. The 
example might suggest that students value their privacy less than the 
opportunity of being considered for admission. This assumes rational 
decision-making based on full information, or a correct assessment of 
very low-value-low-risk information. While this is probably accurate in 
the context of primary employment, the complex nature of application 
files, taken together with the prospects of limited and asymmetrical 
                                                           
 159. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 11. 
 160. See generally Schwartz, Personal Health Care, supra note 2. 
 161. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More 
Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 555 (1993); Sovern, supra note 61, at 1083-84. 
 162. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 8, at 1151 (“[M]arket imperfections make it difficult to 
negotiate effectively about terms of use as to personal data.”). 
218 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:185 
information, bounded rationality, and market behaviors suggest to the 
contrary in the context of secondary employment. Combined with the 
high social benefit of the higher-education admissions process, this 
explains the extravagantly adhesive relationship that is permitted to exist 
in the admissions process. 
So long as individuals undervalue their personal information 
relative to its market value, there will be a buyer for it in today’s 
information-hungry economy.163 Those coming lawfully into possession 
of personal information about others who have a market basis on which 
to value such information are the beneficiaries of the default rule of 
disclosure. Personal information will persist in being undervalued so 
long as the subject is unaware of the risk of revealing it. In any event, 
the cost to the individual of accurate valuation will be prohibitively high. 
This section has shown that subjects of personal information are not 
interested in selling it and not equipped or motivated to bargain. They do 
willingly “sell,” in the sense of exchange, certain types of personal 
information for more highly valued opportunities, such as to apply to 
universities. Indeed, in exchange for such opportunities they will 
willingly exchange even very high-value personal information that they 
would be unlikely simply to sell for cash. Thus the point of regulation of 
secondary employment of personal information is not how the 
information gets into other hands in the first place, the point is what 
happens to it afterward and the subject’s difficulties both in assessing 
risk and in controlling the answer to that question.164 
2. The Admissions Inefficiencies of Negotiation 
Negotiated private-law arrangements—contracts—constitute 
private-law regulation through negotiated allocation of risk and cost. 
Generally speaking, contract is efficient, employing bargained 
                                                           
 163. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1465 (observing that there is enormous and growing 
demand for personal information). 
 164. See, e.g., Karas, supra note 4, at 409-10. The notion of “privacy” is actually a notion of 
ability to control “circulation of information relating to oneself.” Id. (citing ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 23 (1971); id. at 423 (“[T]he 
core impulse in . . . [trying to regulate] privacy scandals is controlling information, not getting paid 
for it.”). Karas goes on to observe that “privacy should be framed not as mere control over personal 
information, but rather information that expresses one’s identity.” Id. at 427 (citing Francis S. 
Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 
154-56 (1991); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977)). 
Unless Karas is suggesting that regulation be based on some sort of paternalistic judgment, he 
should consider that “privacy,” a uniquely personal concept, constitutes a matrix of personal 
decisions about what to exchange for what, efficiency in an economic sense. Government regulation 
of personal decisions is like a stopped clock—it gets these kinds of considerations right only 
occasionally. It’s the default rule that’s key. It should be reversed. 
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exchanges to transfer rights in goods and services to persons who value 
them more highly than do the transferors.165 Economics assumes that in 
a contractual exchange each party obtains a good or service that they 
value more highly than that which they exchanged, a result that is 
privately and socially efficient. By the same token, a party’s refusal to 
exchange demonstrates that they value what they have more highly than 
what is being offered in exchange, and that also is efficient. 
The perceived private and social benefits of private-law regulation 
are demonstrated by the insight of Professor Ronald Coase, that where 
transaction cost is sufficiently low, in rationally seeking to maximize 
their respective best interests parties to a transaction will bargain away 
from initial allocations of risk and cost toward mutually satisfactory 
allocations.166 Negotiated outcomes will accordingly tend toward private 
and social efficiency. 
“Initial allocations” in this context refers to the starting point for 
bargains. In patterns of bargaining that feature many similar 
transactions, efficiency suggests normalized starting places—default 
rules. These are the common-law starting places for private-law 
bargains. 
Efficiency further suggests that default rules not be random but 
rather be either majoritarian or coercive, depending on the degree of 
informational and bargaining symmetry in particular transactions. Where 
information and bargaining power are reasonably symmetrical, a default 
rule can appropriately be set as that which would be the result of the 
majority of negotiations. Such majoritarian default rules reduce 
transaction cost across the board both by reducing the number of 
transactions in which the parties would find it necessary to negotiate out 
of the default rule,167 and by setting a workable rule to regulate 
transactions in which the parties do not negotiate the point. In either 
case, efficiency is enhanced over the long run. 
Coercive default rules are set so as to disadvantage a party that 
would otherwise benefit from an information asymmetry, stimulating 
such a party to initiate bargaining and reveal such information as the 
price of negotiating around the rule.168 
As transaction cost (including information cost) rises, initial 
allocations of risk and cost are correspondingly less likely to be adjusted 
through bargaining to an efficient result. High transaction cost, and 
particularly asymmetrical information cost, reduces the efficiencies of 
                                                           
 165. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 27, at 93-98. 
 166. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 167. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 3, at 2412. 
 168. Id. at 2413-16. 
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contract as private regulation because it interferes with the bargain. 
When transaction cost is high default rules are correspondingly less 
likely to be negotiated around, so that the default rule tends toward the 
mandatory, to the advantage of the party benefiting from the default rule. 
The market becomes less free (and therefore less efficient). Effectively, 
regulation is performed by the person setting the default rule. It therefore 
becomes important to know who assigns default rules, and on what 
basis. In some sectors public institutions assume a regulatory role, 
creating mandatory rules (ruling out bargaining) or default rules and 
sometimes a mixture of the two (business corporation statutes, for 
example). In privately regulated transactions default rules may be set by 
market norms or may be set inferentially by common-law outcomes. 
More to the present point, default rules may also be set by oligopolistic 
possessors of scarce resources in a position persistently to set default 
rules (for example, cable television companies in consumer 
transactions)169 or by a class of contracting parties with characteristically 
superior knowledge and bargaining leverage over their opposite numbers 
(think of lawyers, relative to their clients). Because of the unlikelihood 
of any revision of the default rule in such cases, the resulting 
transactions will have adhesive qualities. Depending upon the 
desirability, or the necessity, of access to the goods or services offered 
by such parties, adhesive qualities give the advantaged party access to 
opportunistic or rent-seeking behaviors. When default rules are set in 
this way the result is socially and privately inefficient because they tend 
to over-compensate the advantaged party.170 
The efficiency position favoring private-law regulation, then, is 
most likely valid where transaction cost (including information cost) is 
low. Validity will decline progressively as such cost rises. Such cost will 
rise for so long as the advantaged party, acting rationally, sets the default 
rules in its own best interest. 
In seeking an optimal approach to the university application 
process, the efficiencies of bargain suggest themselves, particularly in 
light of the variety of implicated interests among school, applicant, and 
the various contributors to application files. Contract would permit 
creation of customized, negotiated expectations of privacy in the sense 
of permissible use. 
In the admissions context, however, contract as an efficient general 
solution does not long withstand analysis, for two reasons. One is the 
                                                           
 169. See, e.g., Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 49 P.3d 647 (2002) (describing 
negotiating advantages of the home builder over buyers who were “not sophisticated consumers”). 
 170. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 27, at 115-18.  
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highly adhesive nature of admissions, rendering individual transactions 
inefficient, as just described. True bargaining in the highly adhesive 
admissions context is problematic in any event. Default rules set by 
schools would effectively be mandatory as to both primary and 
secondary employment of personal information accumulated in 
application files. The problem of excessive secondary disclosure would 
arise. 
The other reason contract will not lead to efficient results under the 
present regime is transaction cost. To negotiate a privacy expectation 
with every applicant and every other contributor to every application file 
would result in insupportable aggregate transaction cost. The lack of 
uniform result would add further to aggregate cost. In this respect it is 
worth noting, again, that higher-education applicants have no right to see 
their own files and therefore cannot accurately value what they would be 
negotiating for in any event. 
On a social basis, then, over the long run more would almost 
certainly be lost than gained by attempting to regulate control of 
application information on an individualized, private-law basis of 
negotiated exchange. In terms of social cost, we must look beyond 
individual negotiation. 
The contract objective of fulfillment of expectations should not be 
abandoned, however. Indeed, because individuals’ valuations of privacy 
vary so extremely, contract should be the positive basis of the 
application process. It best explains the behavior of applicants and 
schools. But for the expectation of purpose-informed limitation on use, 
applicants would not lay themselves so bare. Individuals do not lay 
themselves bare, incurring the attendant costs, for nothing in exchange 
and without conditions. Such a result is not likely to fall within a 
majority of individuals’ reasonable expectations.171 
Under the present admissions regime, provision of personal 
information is treated as a condition of entering the admissions process. 
This crucially overlooks the true exchange that occurs. Contract 
validates the value of an expectation of something occurring in the 
future. In the application context the applicant’s expectation is the 
school’s reasonable stewardship of personal information willingly 
disclosed. This is discussed further in the next Part. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW, COERCIVE DEFAULT RULE 
In this Part, I suggest that the default rule for secondary 
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employment of application-file information should be reversed—no 
secondary employment—and that reasonable care should be taken by 
schools to prevent file leakage. This should be an enforceable rule in the 
nature of a relationship of trust and confidence, recognizing the schools’ 
position as stewards of their applicants’ personal information. 
This Article shows that the present regime regulating application 
files is innately inefficient. This inefficiency results from a convergence 
of factors: In the highly adhesive application regime, creation of a 
detailed and intrusive application file is a condition of application, not 
the result of an informed bargaining process between the applicant and 
the school. Applicants do not know and cannot know the value of the 
information that they are required to permit schools to accumulate. 
Applicants do not know and cannot know what secondary use may be 
made of application information. As a result of these two information 
failures applicants’ personal information is undervalued. Like other 
providers of personal information, applicants will have a generalized 
expectation that such information will be limited to the purpose for 
which it was collected, and not be secondarily employed in ways costly 
to them. Unanticipated, excessive secondary employment inconsistent 
with this expectation is costly to the applicants. Applicants who know or 
believe that excessive secondary employment may result, and who are 
otherwise unable to self-protect, will rationally reduce the quality of 
their disclosure, and perhaps not apply at all. Accordingly, the highly 
adhesive regime that applicants face today is inefficient, costly to the 
applicants in terms of secondary employment of their personal 
information, and risky and costly to the schools in terms of admissions 
goals and reputation. 
The current application-information regime is also inappropriate on 
a normative basis. Applicants and other contributors to admissions files 
provide information on the basis of an expectation of use and control 
pertinent to the purpose of the file. Such an expectation is reasonable on 
their part and is foreseeable by schools. If this is true, then the norm 
should be that the files’ use and transmission should be regulated 
congruently with those expectations.172 If applicants do not trust schools’ 
stewardship of the personal information provided them, this norm will 
be enforced by the applicants’ degrading the accuracy and completeness 
of their application files. 
To regulate the application information regime toward efficiency 
requires adjustment of the extreme information asymmetry of the 
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accompanying text.  
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application process. Because, in the nature of the process, applicants 
cannot know the value of what they provide to the schools, efficiency 
requires regulation of the schools’ secondary employment in a way 
congruent with applicants’ generalized expectation that their application 
files will not be used in ways costly to them or indeed in ways 
unexpected by them. 
Applicants’ expectations, and therefore efficiency, would be most 
likely to be served by shifting the positive basis of regulation of 
application-file content—the template, if you will—away from today’s 
totally adhesive environment and toward exchange based on 
expectation—the schools’ expectation of receipt of accurate information 
and the applicants’ expectation that the information will not be 
secondarily employed in unanticipated, and risky, ways. The default rule 
should be the reverse of the present rule of disclosure: (1) that there will 
be no secondary employment at all; that is, that application information 
will be used solely for the purpose for which it was acquired; and (2) 
that schools will undertake reasonable efforts to avoid file leakage. This 
notion of exchange should be the common-law starting place, enforced 
as an ex ante deterrent to excessive secondary employment. 
Schools that find significant gains in secondary employment could 
preserve them by negotiating around the default rule by describing to 
applicants what secondary employment they intend to make of 
application information and limiting secondary employment strictly to 
what is disclosed.173 The terms proffered by the schools would be non-
negotiable—the contract would be as perfectly adhesive as is the present 
regime and for the same reasons of efficiency in the admissions process. 
The difference would be that applicants’ decisions would be informed as 
to how their personal information might be secondarily employed. A 
marketplace would operate in the sense that if applicants would decline 
to apply at schools whose offers were not acceptable. 
What is described here is a coercive default rule,174 designed to 
stimulate disclosure by the school, the party with the relevant 
informational advantage as to secondary employment. The rule needs to 
be coercive in the sense of compelling full disclosure by the school of its 
intentions of both primary and secondary employment, and to its steps to 
                                                           
 173. Cf. Schwartz, Property, supra note 5, at 2082 (“Market-perfecting moves for the personal 
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avoid inadvertent secondary employment. 
Such a rule more accurately describes the positive nature of the 
transaction, which is exchange. Applicants would not have permitted 
these collections of personal information to be assembled outside their 
control but for the purpose of admissions analysis, an expectation in the 
nature of a bargained exchange. To describe the process as such 
recognizes that the applicants’ expectations, including privacy 
preferences, have value.175 
For the school, the question then becomes whether the cost of 
precaution would exceed its efficiency gains. In my opinion, it certainly 
would not. Accurately informed applications are of the highest value to 
schools. Surely schools value more highly accuracy in application-file 
information and the maximization of the number of qualified applicants 
than they do the secondary employment of applicant information. As a 
long-time member of admissions committees, I cannot imagine any 
secondary employment of application-file information that would exceed 
the potential cost in terms of admissions goals and school reputation.176 
Schools would also benefit by engendering trust in applicants. 
Economics research shows that, in sharing personal information, trust is 
of “utmost importance” in order to persuade the subject to “accept the 
risk of the transaction.”177 Further, “perceived privacy and perceived 
security” are seen to be “the chief determinants [of] trust.”178 Trust, 
accordingly, should be of high value to schools in their admissions 
programs. 
Such a rule would lower transaction cost across the board by 
enhancing predictability. It would promote accuracy in the information 
received from the applicant and other contributors to the file, and the 
                                                           
 175. “Value” to the school, in my view, would adhere to any applicant’s preference that would 
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 177. Chellappa, supra note 56, at 34. 
 178. Id. 
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applicant would be able to form more accurate expectations on which to 
base the decision whether to apply. 
This rule allocates costs appropriately between applicant and 
school. File control is performed at least cost by the school. It is best 
positioned to put in place physical and electronic controls over the files 
themselves, and behavior controls over personnel. Secondary application 
and leakage cost to the student will be minimized at much lower cost 
than applicants could perform by monitoring or bargaining. In exchange 
the cost of supplying information will continue to be borne, 
appropriately, by the student, but the quantity and accuracy of the 
information should be enhanced, a value to the school. 
A further incentive for self-regulation through a coercive default 
rule lies in the possibility of the imposition of government regulation. 
Opportunistic use of application information, or carelessness in 
protecting it, could entail cost by justifying government intervention and 
regulation with attendant cost in terms of administration and loss of local 
idiosyncrasy. Under the rule I suggest, remedies would lie in contract, 
not tort or breach of trust. Precaution in self-regulation is therefore well 
justified. 
Remedies have been an issue for privacy-preservation schemes.179 
How are infractions detected and how are infractions valued? In the 
regime I propose, the privacy-preservation rule should be self-enforcing 
once schools understand the potential costs of the present regime. 
Increased awareness among applicants of the issues discussed in this 
Article should lead to market enforcement as well. 
Schools should adopt appropriate policies and publish them to 
applicants.180 Affiliated institutions, such as accrediting agencies, should 
encourage this. 
Schools have great leverage to compel applicants and other 
contributors, such as writers of recommendations, to speak frankly 
through the medium of admissions files. I believe contributors do this 
with a reasonable and foreseeable expectation of limitation of use of 
such information to the admissions process. A regime of regulation 
based on expectation can only enhance the integrity and validity of 
admissions files, and therefore their usefulness for their declared 
purpose. 
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 180. See Chellappa, supra note 56, at 36-37 (suggesting public education of the nature and 
risks of information sharing). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
I have used university applications as an example of the regulation 
of the collection of information in the context of a highly socially 
beneficial activity—so highly beneficial, indeed, that the relationship 
between school and applicant has been permitted to become extremely 
adhesive in favor of the institutional information collector. As 
demonstrated by the example of university admissions, these 
relationships have a strong propensity for inefficiency when they are so 
highly adhesive that one party can elicit private facts from another with 
no limits on secondary employment. Such relationships effectively are 
an exception to the usual rule of efficiency of disclosure, and, on account 
of transaction cost, fall outside the ambit of Coasean logic. Regulation 
won’t be performed by the market because high adhesion is, in effect, a 
market failure. This generality can apply to many kinds of relationships 
in addition to school applications—parent-teacher associations, charities, 
children’s sports teams, religious organizations, investment clubs, 
housing associations, buying clubs, retirement organizations, interest 
groups of various kinds—any sort of group that is of sufficiently high-
value social and private benefit that it is able to demand, collect and 
maintain personal information, bringing to bear short-term market 
behaviors and rational ignorance—and that is not yet regulated by the 
government. The value of secondary employment is allocated as a 
windfall to the dominant party, while cost of excessive secondary 
employment or file leakage is allocated to the subservient party. 
The inefficiency will come home to roost. The Yale/Princeton 
admissions-file hacking incident is an example, and the literature is 
filled with lists of disasters.181 
This Article suggests that the regulatory answer is new starting 
places, coercive default rules bearing on the dominant party, stimulating 
surrender by that party of its information dominance. The positive basis 
would be contract, and reasonable expectations.182 Empirical inquiry 
shows that this is the norm.183 A coercive default rule of no secondary 
employment would serve both efficiency and the indistinct privacy 
norm. 
                                                           
 181. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 2, at 1501-05 (describing conflicts arising from 
information collections unanticipated by the subjects). 
 182. See Litman, supra note 8, at 1307-11 (observing that individuals experience “outrage” 
when secondary employment of their private facts exceeds their reasonable expectations). As 
Professor Litman notes, the Restatement contemplates enforcement of express limitations of 
secondary employment. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 892(2), 892A cmt. g.) 
 183. See Schwartz, Personal Health Care, supra note 2, at 44. See also supra notes 65-66 and 
accompanying text. 
